Trump’s Return and the Future of U.S.-Armenia Relations

The return of Donal Trump to the White House comes at a crucial moment for the South Caucasus. Armenia, once a best friend of Russia, is pivoting towards the West, while the region undergoes major geopolitical shifts. What does Trump’s return mean for U.S.-Armenia relations?

The South Caucasus is in flux. Armenia is breaking away from Russia, Georgia is leaning back toward Moscow, and Azerbaijan has deepened ties with the Kremlin (Primeminister.am 2024; Tchaikovsky & Giragosian 2024). Since its independence in the 1990s, Georgia has officially pursued Euro-Atlantic integration, but the re-election of the ruling pro-Russian party Georgian Dream risks bringing the country back into Moscow’s orbit (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2024; BBC 2024). Azerbaijan, which had previously maintained a neutral stance in its European or Russian alignment, is currently hitting it off with the Kremlin, upgrading the relationship to the level of a strategic alliance (President.az 2022).

The United States’ approach to the South Caucasus has fluctuated over the years. While the Obama administration paid attention to regional security issues, the Trump administration largely ignored the region. Biden attempted to re-establish U.S. engagement, particularly in peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Washington track became one of the three primary diplomatic pathways for resolving tensions, alongside the Brussels and Moscow tracks (Blinken 2023; Giragosian 2022). However, whether this level of U.S. involvement will continue under Trump remains uncertain.

The State of US-Armenia Relations

Under Biden, U.S.-Armenia relations reached new heights. In January 2025, they were upgraded from a “Strategic Dialogue” to a “Strategic Partnership” (US Department of State 2025). Public sentiment reflected this improvement: by the end of 2023, 89% of Armenians viewed U.S.-Armenia relations as “good,” a sharp rise from 65% in 2021 (IRI Survey 2023).

Key developments included a $65 million U.S. aid package to support Armenia’s Euro-Atlantic integration and the suspension of military aid to Azerbaijan following Baku’s 2023 recapture of Nagorno-Karabakh (Ghazanchyan 2024). The U.S. also conducted joint military drills with Armenia and explored cooperation on nuclear energy (US Department of State 2024; Azatutyun Radio 2024). These steps signified Washington’s willingness to strengthen Armenia’s sovereignty and security.

A landmark moment in U.S.-Armenia relations came in 2021 when Biden officially recognized the Armenian Genocide, becoming the first U.S. president to do so unequivocally (The White House 2021). This move was widely celebrated by Armenian communities worldwide, strengthening their trust in the Democratic administration. However, this trust was tested when the Biden administration failed to prevent Azerbaijan’s offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh and the subsequent ethnic cleansing of Armenians from the region (ANCA 2024; Politico 2023).

Trump’s Approach: What’s Likely to Change?

Trump’s foreign policy stance has always been transactional. In his first term, the South Caucasus was largely ignored—his 2017 National Security Strategy didn’t even mention the region. His “America First” approach deprioritized engagement, and during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, his administration took a hands-off stance, urging external actors not to intervene rather than leading peace efforts (The Guardian 2020). Despite this, Trump’s campaign for the 2024 election actively sought the support of Armenian-American voters, particularly in swing states such as Nevada and Michigan. He openly criticized the Biden administration’s handling of the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis and pledged greater support for Armenian security. However, given his previous record, whether such promises translate into actual policy remains uncertain. Moreover, his campaign included high-profile figures sympathetic to Armenia, such as Tulsi Gabbard, Vivek Ramaswamy, and Robert F. Kennedy Jr. Their influence could shape future policies in Armenia’s favor. In February 2025, Armenia’s government struck a $250 million deal with US-based Lydian International to restart the Amulsar gold mine, a fast-tracked move that blindsided the public with little prior warning (The US Embassy, 2025).

Red Flags for Armenia

Financial assistance has always been a crucial element in the U.S.-Armenia ties. While Biden secured funding for Armenia’s economic and defense cooperation, Trump’s first term saw a sharp disparity in U.S. aid allocations. The Trump administration proposed major cuts to Armenia’s assistance, including the termination of USAID projects crucial for humanitarian relief and economic development (Giragosian 2025). Meanwhile, Azerbaijan received over $100 million in U.S. military aid, a move criticized for emboldening Baku’s aggressive policies (ANCA 2019). The imbalance in aid distribution became even more apparent during Trump’s tenure, raising concerns about future commitments under his second term.

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev openly voiced his preference for Donald Trump in the 2024 U.S. presidential elections (Eurasianet 2024). During the Second Shusha Global Media Forum in July, Aliyev praised Trump as a champion of peace, mentioning that “during President Trump’s presidency, we enjoyed very fruitful cooperation based on mutual respect and appreciation of each other’s support on different tracks” (President.az 2024). This endorsement raises doubts about whether Trump’s policies will favor Azerbaijan over Armenia.

Another major concern is Trump’s history of neglecting human rights issues in foreign policy decision-making. Unlike Biden, Trump never formally recognized the Armenian Genocide. Throughout his first term, his administration avoided addressing this issue despite bipartisan congressional resolutions urging him to do so (BBC 2019). Additionally, his administration’s policy of favoring transactional diplomacy over values-based engagement suggests that Armenia’s democratic reforms and Western orientation may not be priorities in a second Trump term.

The Bottom Line

While some Trump campaign moves suggest potential benefits for Armenia, his broader track record and regional alliances point to challenges ahead. Trump’s transactional diplomacy means he is unlikely to prioritize Armenia unless it serves his broader political interests. His close ties with Azerbaijan, the neglect of the South Caucasus, and possible reduction in engagement suggest that the progress made under Biden may stall—or even reverse.

For Armenia, a second Trump presidency is a mixed bag. While his administration might offer symbolic gestures toward Armenian-American voters, real policy changes benefiting Armenia remain uncertain. Additionally, his strong pro-Israel stance and potential alignment with Azerbaijan on anti-Iran initiatives might intensify regional tensions for Armenia (Avetisyan 2024). A less active U.S. policy in the region would diminish Armenia’s leverage in ongoing negotiations and weaken its positioning in the international arena.

Given these factors, the most likely scenario under a second Trump term is a continuation of the U.S.’s disengagement from the South Caucasus in general and Armenia-Azerbaijan peace negotiations in particular. While there are areas where the U.S.-Armenia relations could see improvement, the overall impact of a Trump presidency is expected to be negative, with Armenia’s concerns remaining sidelined in favor of broader geopolitical interests.

[Photo by the White House, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons]

Asya Gasparyan is a PhD Student at the School of International Studies (SIS) at the University of Trento. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from the Yerevan State University of the Republic of Armenia (2021-2023).  She was a former intern at the MFA of Armenian and a Research Fellow at the Regional Studies Center (Yerevan). The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.