Russia’s Aims in Africa – The Geopolitics

As the 2022 invasion of Ukraine sparked international outrage, a different picture was being drawn half a world away. Bangui, the capital of the Central African Republic, hosts a peculiar, life-sized statue. Honoring the defense of the city against attacking rebels in 2021, it portrays a woman and two small children, huddled together behind a line of armed defenders: Central African and Russian soldiers, holding assault rifles. Around the time that Wagner Group mercenaries were taking part in the invasion of a sovereign European state, that same group was being lauded as a protector and liberator by a crowd of Central Africans, carrying flowers and Russian flags. How did Russia’s influence in Africa grow so strong and what are its aims going forward?

One recent example is eye-catching. In the beginning of this year, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso announced their withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), instead forming an “Alliance of Sahel States” (AES). Having undergone coups in the 2020s, all three countries are now run by military juntas. There are massive security concerns: the trio is locked in a brutal struggle against trans-African terrorists. Jihadist organisations to the North with al-Qaeda and ISIS affiliations conduct lethal attacks on military and civilian targets, leading to massive fatalities. As such, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso are all on the top 10 list of countries affected by terrorism, according to the 2024 Global Terrorism Index. Burkina Faso is considered the most terrorism-affected country in the world with over 2,000 deaths, placing it above states like Israel, Afghanistan and Iraq.

AES members are displeased with previous assistance from ECOWAS and the West, and have been pushing for military exits from the U.S. and – most notably – their former colonial overlord France. The trio has been publicly outspoken against what it perceives as Western “imperialist” aims. The G5 Sahel, a Francophone security alliance, has effectively collapsed, with all AES member states having announced their respective exits. As regional cooperation is left behind, as France is rebuffed and the U.S. military is ousted, the three countries have instead been courted by the Kremlin.

As such, Russia’s presence in Africa has increased drastically. Mali and Burkina Faso have had its soldiers operating on their soil for some years in the form of Wagner Group operatives, while Niger started hosting Russian forces only recently. Following the death of its leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, Wagner has gradually been replaced with a new entity called the “Africa Corps”, this time operating under the definitive control of the Russian Ministry of Defence. No doubt Prigozhin’s short-lived 2023 coup attempt has pushed the Russian government into more strict control of its mercenaries abroad. Russia remains invested in the continent, promising not only a continued presence but a ramp-up in activities.

Historically, results have been bad to mixed. Human rights groups have reported that Russian mercenaries are helping Mali’s military launch drone strikes against civilian targets such as weddings and funerals, leading to heavy casualties. Both mercenaries and the Malian army are said to have arrested and later executed people taken from villages, including children, and there are open-source investigations detailing claims of Wagner killings, abuses and other attacks on non-combatants. In Burkina Faso and Niger meanwhile, jihadist groups are still conducting brutal attacks on soldiers and civilians, the threat of terrorism appearing largely unabated.

As Russia attempts to assist the AES in its wars, it has also brought a war of its own making to the continent. In July, a large rebel ambush left dozens of Malian soldiers and Russian mercenaries dead. Ukraine’s military intelligence agency GUR would later confirm that they had provided the militants with the information needed to plan the attack, prompting Mali to cut diplomatic ties with Kyiv. Russia’s war in Ukraine is affecting the countries it is trying to sway, which previously had no stake in it.

So what is the end goal for Russia in the AES countries and Africa in general? Put shortly, the Kremlin is projecting soft power across the continent and collecting resources that bolster its hard power at home. By strengthening ties with African leaders and embracing the anti-colonialist cause, Russia plays on the colonial past to weaken Western standing in Africa, and drum up support for itself. Under Prigozhin this was already the case, as some of the old leader’s cadres were co-opting the Pan-African movement to promote explicitly Russian interests. Even the Russian Orthodox church has been accused of acting as a soft power arm of the state. The Moscow Patriarchate is currently attempting to aggressively expand its faith in Africa and has distanced itself from churches that recognize its Ukrainian counterpart.

Meanwhile there is the pursuit of material wealth and by extension, hard power. For example, Mali is one of the largest gold exporters in the world and a treasure trove of other mineral deposits. For all its anti-colonial posturing, the Kremlin knows this. Earlier this year, its troops were granted control of one of the country’s gold mines and there are plans in place for a Russian refinery to be built, which would be West Africa’s largest. In Burkina Faso the situation is similar, and the country has been accused of paying Wagner forces with access to a mineral mine. Some Western mining companies are quitting their ventures in AES countries, while Russian ones operating in Burkina Faso are being offered tax breaks. In Niger – one of the world’s prime exporters of uranium – French nuclear fuel company Orano recently had their operational permit revoked. Predictably, Russian fuel producer Rosatom is waiting in the wings, ready to take over operations. France, who has long been reliant on uranium from Niger, is being pushed out.

As such, Russia’s natural resource strategy in Africa is beneficial not just due to what Russia stands to gain, but due to what Western powers stand to lose. These concessions, meanwhile, are fueling its military aggression in Europe and will be no less important when the conflict ends. On the contrary: significant funding will be required to repair the battered Russian military – funding that African resources could provide. In essence, one tradition of African wealth extraction is being replaced by another.

Russia’s African strategy is successful because it builds on two true things. First, the West has an atrocious record of exploitation in Africa, which can easily be weaponized. Second, Russia has no comparable such history and has propped itself up as an anti-colonial ally since the start of the Cold War. For a former colonial superpower like France, arguing these points is impossible, as is competing with the most crucial thing African dictators gain from the relationship: regime stability. Russian mercenaries have provided security for junta leaders in the past and there is no reason to believe this will not continue. By its very nature, a military junta is dependent on brute force to shore up what it lacks in legitimacy – something Russia is able to provide. Western democracies, on the other hand, cannot be seen doing this.

Future Western attempts to build back influence across the continent must grapple with these realities and come up with serious answers to them. These must both be strong enough to have a meaningful impact and suitable enough for a modern democracy – a tough line to walk.

[Photo by kremlin.ru, via Wikimedia Commons]

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.