Before and after the US presidential election in 2024, there has been a debate on whether Mr Donald Trump can be described as a realist in international relations. For example, Andrew Byers and Randall Schweller suggests in Foreign Affairs in July 2024 that Trump is “a true realist”, who understands the limit of American power in the post-Cold War era thereby focusing on America’s own interest over the world’s well-being. In this framework, the America First agenda becomes “an intellectually defensible, fundamentally realist program”. In the same journal in January 2025, however, Jonathan Kirshner makes a strong case that President Trump is not a realist at all. He lacks calculated and reasonable toughness and national interest-based wisdom. Rather, he is filled with “bluster and cynicism” pursuing “a zero-sum confrontation” in global affairs. Thus, the America First agenda is not a realist foreign policy.
I find this debate important and intriguing. As a Korean myself, however, it seems there is something missing. To be honest, I did not expect that Mr Trump would be elected as the President. Mr Trump’s sometimes unpredictable and reckless personality and policy has worried me as a member of the global community.
But when it comes to North Korea, President Trump’s second term might bring something positive. It is clearly evidenced by his remarks on Chairman Kim Jong-un right after President Trump assumed the second term: “He liked me. I liked him.” Of course, President Trump can be unpredictable and everything remains uncertain. But at least as a Korean, I strongly believe that North and South Korea must take advantage of this unexpected and rather sad moment in global terms. The second Trump presidency should be translated into a unique opportunity to materialize the denuclearization of North Korea and the peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
Speaking of unexpectedness, the recent development in South Korea needs to be highlighted. Almost no one in South Korea, including the ruling People Power Party, expected that President Yoon Suk-yeol would declare a martial law on Dec. 3, 2024. At the time, President Yoon was struggling with his approval rating of less than 20%. The South Korean public was agonized by Yoon’s poor performance and highly divisive politics. While distressed by the unexpected martial law stunt, the public began to see a silver lining: the time to impeach him.
Reflecting on the public mood, the National Assembly passed the motion to impeach President Yoon around 10 days later. The Constitutional Court is now deliberating the case in accordance with the law. If the Court approves the impeachment, it would have huge implications. First, President Yoon will leave his office about two years earlier than planned. Second, with the former President Park Geun-hye, South Korean conservatives will be embarrassed by the two consecutively impeached presidents. Third, most importantly, as Yoon will be gone with the wind of impeachment, his naïve and fanatic foreign policy will be gone as well: most notably, a mysteriously hostile policy toward China and strangely aggressive policy toward North Korea. This is where a potential next presidential election comes in. An educated guess is that the next president may come from the opposition Democratic Party. If realized, a significant change in foreign policy will emerge: more friendly policies toward China and North Korea, and more balanced policies toward the US and Japan.
Then, there is North Korea which is no stranger to unexpectedness. In December 2023, Chairman Kim Jong-un declared that North and South Korea are “two hostile states” on the Korean Peninsula meaning North Korea will relinquish the policy of reunification. Kim’s two-state proposition bewildered many people, including experts, because it means that Kim will go against his father Kim Jong-il’s (his predecessor) and grandfather Kim Il-sung’s (the founder of North Korea) lifetime wish: one nation and one state on the Korean Peninsula. Considering that a great deal of his legitimacy is derived from his father’s and grandfather’s legacies, Kim Jong-un’s two-state proposition constitutes a political surprise. It is indeed surprising in the sense that North Korea’s constitution explicitly mentions “reunification” several times, for example in the Preamble and Article 9.
Did Chairman Kim really mean what he said? It remains to be seen. One important thing to remember is that North Korea had maintained a miraculously eloquent relationship with South Korea during the Moon Jae-in government. There had been three consecutive summits in April, May and September all in 2018. Once the Yoon Suk-yeol government was launched in 2022, however, inter-Korean relations faced enormous challenges. It is this context that we have to take into account when Kim’s two-state proposition is explored. If the opposition party returns to power, Chairman Kim may change his mind. Therefore, rather than taking Kim’s policy shift at face value, we might want prudence. After all, Kim has not changed the constitution yet. That means the idea of reunification is still alive in North Korea at least in the supreme law.
To conclude, as a Korean, I strongly urge the US, North and South Korea to work together to make the most of this unique and unexpected opportunity. North Korea could scrap its nuclear weapons program in exchange for sufficient economic development fund. The US could have a non-aggression pact with North Korea. South Korea could restore friendly relations with its Northern neighbor eventually leading to a peace treaty. It is the right thing to do. The stakeholder nations must strive to end the ongoing conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Of course, too much optimism should be avoided. But the time has come, unexpectedly, and all the relevant parties should seize the moment.
The era of unexpectedness warrants courage. Indeed, Charles Dickens in Great Expectations: “In a word, I was too cowardly to do what I knew to be right, as I had been too cowardly to avoid doing what I knew to be wrong.”
[Photo by the Trump White House, via Wikimedia Commons]
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.
Dr. Sungju Park-Kang is Research Fellow at the DPRK Strategic Research Center, KIMEP University, Kazakhstan and Adjunct Professor at the Centre for East Asian Studies, University of Turku, Finland. Park-Kang was formerly Assistant Professor of International Relations and Korean Studies at Leiden University, the Netherlands and the University of Central Lancashire, UK.
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