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The sudden exit of longtime Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has thrown Bangladesh into uncertainty. Hasina held an iron grip on power since 2009, but student protests escalated when security services fired on demonstrators resulting in the collapse of her Awami League-led government. Many have speculated on how new governance will impact Bangladesh’s foreign policy, including its relations with India, China and the United States. What remains largely absent from the dialogue is the reality that the once-close ties between Bangladesh and Russia are unlikely to remain as strong or significant.
Dhaka’s close ties with Moscow date back to the Soviet Union’s support for Bangladesh’s independence in 1971. Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s visit to Moscow in 1972 set the stage for deeper engagement, but following the 1975 coup, which ousted Awami League, Bangladesh reoriented its foreign policy away from the Soviet Union.
Over the decades, a cyclical pattern of engagement with Moscow emerged: relations strengthened under Awami League rule but weakened during Bangladesh National Party (BNP) administrations. Notable parallels can be drawn to Bangladesh-India relations, where the Awami League has often aligned with India, while the BNP has a more complicated history. This is not a coincidence; Moscow generally defers to Delhi on matters concerning its neighbors and in turn, India has facilitated their engagement with Russia.
Following in her father’s footsteps, Sheikh Hasina elevated ties with Moscow to a new high. During both her first and second terms, she authorized purchases of Russian military equipment. But Hasina’s most significant step was a deal for Bangladesh’s first nuclear power plant, constructed by Russia’s state-run nuclear energy corporation, Rosatom. The majority of the nearly $13 billion cost is funded through loan from Moscow, and the plant is expected to become operational in 2025.
Hasina’s affinity for Moscow also extended to the diplomatic sphere, demonstrated by Dhaka’s hesitancy to criticize the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Yet Hasina’s efforts to balance friendly relations with both the United States and Russia spilled into the open during a 2022 diplomatic standoff between their respective embassies in Dhaka. Tensions also manifested when the delivery of Russian nuclear fuel initially arrived on a U.S.-sanctioned ship and was refused entry to Bangladesh.
Yet with Hasina out of power and Awami League participation in upcoming elections unlikely, Moscow is without a friend in Dhaka. Losing a partner like Bangladesh risks undermining Russia’s broader outreach to the Global South at a time when it needs allies more than ever. As a result, Russia’s response to the crisis in Bangladesh has been cautiously neutral.
Immediately after Hasina’s exit, the Russian Ambassador to Bangladesh called the situation an “internal matter” and made clear the willingness to “work with any government.” Later meeting on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in October 2024, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabakov backed Dhaka’s entry into the organization and pledged to advance “matured” relations.
At the same time, Russian state media has openly speculated on the protests’ origin. While one expert pointed to economic “discontent among young people,” another claimed that the protests were initiated by the West, a rumor which the White House has denied. The dual approach of limited public criticism, while expressing dissatisfaction through indirect channels is common in Moscow’s engagement with partners. But despite private frustration, Russia is likely to continue outreach to whatever government forms following elections, planned for late 2025 or early 2026.
If the BNP emerges victorious, it is expected to maintain Bangladesh’s policy of “friendship to all, malice to none,” while leaning towards Western partners. Historically, the BNP has continued existing projects with Russia but rarely pursued stronger ties. Under its rule, Dhaka may prioritize other partners more capable of supporting its development goals. Alternatively, a Jamaat-e-Islami-led coalition would have little precedent for engagement with Russia. While Moscow prides itself on the “Islamic dimension” of its foreign policy, it has few personal ties to Jamaat leadership, which would likely focus on strengthening ties with the Islamic world.
Yet despite Moscow’s pragmatic approach, new governance in Bangladesh is unlikely to prioritize outreach to Russia, regardless of which party prevails. The Rooppur project’s significance has not protected it from an Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) investigation into reports of embezzlement. While Rosatom denies any wrongdoing, the scandal could weaken trust and lead to negative perceptions of Russia in Bangladesh. Additionally, while Moscow appointed a new Ambassador to Bangladesh in October 2024, Dhaka has yet to reciprocate since withdrawing its own in August.
However, current bilateral strains are overshadowed by more immediate priorities. Russia’s strategic focus remains on Ukraine and its near abroad while Bangladesh faces pressing issues including Rohingya refugees, climate change and balancing relations between India and China.
Hasina’s sudden exit represents an acute setback for Russia’s ambitions in the region, forcing Moscow to recalibrate its South Asia policy while balancing broader challenges. Nonetheless, external observers would be wise to appreciate that Moscow and Dhaka’s historical ties run deep, offering a foundation that may outlast current geopolitical shifts.
[Photo by Md Joni Hossain, via Wikimedia Commons]
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.
Lucas Daley is a third-year undergraduate studying economics and politics at Oberlin College. He speaks Russian and has previously interned at think tanks in India and Georgia, where his research focused on Russia-South Asia relations.
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