For over three decades, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been locked in a bitter conflict, primarily over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, a territory internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan but historically populated by ethnic Armenians. The two nations have fought two devastating wars, with the most recent in 2020 culminating in Azerbaijan’s decisive victory and the 2023 exodus of nearly 100,000 Armenians from Karabakh. In March 2025, a glimmer of hope emerged when both sides announced the finalization of a draft peace treaty, titled the “Agreement on Peace and Establishment of Interstate Relations.” Yet, despite this milestone, the treaty remains unsigned, and escalating tensions, mutual distrust, and unresolved issues threaten to derail the peace process.
A Hard-Won Draft Amid Persistent Tensions
The announcement on March 13, 2025, that Armenia and Azerbaijan had finalized the text of a peace agreement was a significant step forward. The breakthrough came after months of stalled negotiations, with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan making key concessions to resolve two major sticking points: the withdrawal of legal claims in international courts and an agreement to exclude third-party forces, such as Russian border monitors, from their shared border. The treaty focuses on normalizing state-to-state relations, emphasizing mutual recognition of territorial integrity, ceasing legal disputes, and withdrawing foreign peacekeeping missions. However, it notably sidesteps societal reconciliation, war crime accountability, and the contentious issue of Nagorno-Karabakh’s status, which was settled by force in 2023 when Azerbaijan regained full control.
Pashinyan has been the driving force behind Armenia’s push for peace, viewing it as essential for stabilizing the country after its 2020 defeat and fostering a democratic, Western-oriented “Real Armenia” . His willingness to make concessions, including recognizing Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over Karabakh, has drawn fierce domestic and diaspora opposition. Many Armenians view his approach as a betrayal of historical grievances, particularly the 1915 Armenian Genocide and the loss of Karabakh. In a February 2025 speech at the Atlantic Council, Pashinyan framed peace as a prerequisite for democracy, stating, “We cannot have democracy in an environment of war”. Yet, his vision faces resistance from those who argue that deprioritizing historical claims weakens Armenia’s leverage.
On the Azerbaijani side, President Ilham Aliyev has adopted a more reserved stance. While Baku expressed satisfaction with the draft treaty, it imposed preconditions for signing, including amendments to Armenia’s constitution to remove references to Nagorno-Karabakh and the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group, which mediated the conflict for decades. Azerbaijan’s confidence stems from its military and geopolitical dominance, bolstered by its 2020 victory and economic autonomy from Russia. Aliyev’s rhetoric often emphasizes Azerbaijan’s strength, with statements like, “We are the stronger side, we are the ones who have a strong position at the negotiating table”. This hardline approach and the accusations of Armenian military buildup, have fueled skepticism about Baku’s commitment to peace.
Unresolved Issues: The Zangezur Corridor and Constitutional Demands
Two major issues continue to complicate the peace process: the Zangezur Corridor and Armenia’s constitutional preamble. The Zangezur Corridor, a proposed land route connecting Azerbaijan’s mainland to its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenian territory, has been a persistent sticking point. Azerbaijan initially demanded extraterritorial rights, which would effectively extend its sovereignty over the route, a proposal Armenia rejected as a violation of its territorial integrity. In early 2025, Pashinyan signaled flexibility, proposing simplified transit procedures similar to those Azerbaijan would enjoy on a planned railway via Iran. However, Azerbaijan’s insistence on revisiting the issue, despite earlier agreements to address it separately, has raised concerns about its intentions.
The constitutional issue is equally contentious. Azerbaijan demands that Armenia amend its constitution’s preamble, which references a 1990 Declaration of Independence that includes a call for the unification of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Baku views this as a latent territorial claim. Pashinyan has indicated plans for a new constitution by 2026, but domestic opposition and the political sensitivity of altering the preamble make this a risky endeavor. Some analysts suggest a compromise, such as framing constitutional reform as a bilateral confidence-building measure, but the timeline and political will remain uncertain.
Escalating Tensions and Ceasefire Violations
Despite the finalized draft, the situation on the ground is deteriorating. Since March 13, both sides have reported over 30 ceasefire violations, with Azerbaijan accusing Armenia of 24 breaches and Armenia alleging attacks, including the shelling of a cultural center in Syunik Province on April 13. Social media videos, though unverified, show Armenian forces allegedly deploying to the Nakhchivan border, prompting Azerbaijan to claim that Yerevan is preparing for war. A commentary by Caliber.az, a pro-government Azerbaijani outlet, warned of a potential conflict within weeks, citing Armenia’s arms buildup. Armenia, in turn, denies these accusations and has proposed a joint mechanism to investigate ceasefire violations, a suggestion Baku has ignored.
These incidents underscore the fragility of the peace process. Azerbaijan’s military spending, which has doubled over the past five years, far outpaces Armenia’s, giving Baku a significant advantage. Meanwhile, Armenia’s military exercises with Iran in April 2025 signal a shift toward new security partnerships, particularly as Yerevan distances itself from Russia and expresses frustration with Western guarantees. Iran’s opposition to territorial changes, particularly the Zangezur Corridor, adds another layer of complexity, as Tehran fears losing trade access to Armenia.
Geopolitical Maneuvering and Russia’s Role
The peace process is further complicated by geopolitical dynamics, with Russia, the EU, and the United States vying for influence. Russia, once a dominant player in the Caucasus, has seen its regional leverage wane due to its focus on Ukraine and Armenia’s pivot to the West. Moscow’s failure to protect Armenian interests in Karabakh in 2023 shattered its image as a security guarantor, prompting Armenia to formalize ties with the EU and the U.S. through a strategic partnership agreement in January 2025. However, recent Armenian efforts to mend ties with Russia, including halting the removal of Russian border guards, suggest a pragmatic attempt to counterbalance Azerbaijan’s demands.
Russia may seek to play a spoiler role, arguing that the 2020 ceasefire agreement, brokered under its patronage, remains valid absent a signed treaty. Azerbaijan’s strained relations with Moscow, particularly after a Russian missile downed an Azerbaijani civilian plane in December 2024, could push Baku toward softer negotiating positions with Armenia if tensions persist. Meanwhile, the EU’s civilian border monitoring mission (EUMA), extended until 2027, faces uncertainty due to the treaty’s exclusion of third-party forces.
Domestic and Diaspora Pressures
Pashinyan’s peace agenda faces significant domestic and diaspora opposition. Critics argue that his concessions, such as recognizing Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan, undermine Armenia’s sovereignty and historical claims. The Armenian Weekly, a diaspora publication, accused Pashinyan of depriving Armenians of their right to dream of a “historic Armenia” (Armenian Weekly, 2025). With parliamentary elections looming in 2026, Pashinyan has framed his “Real Armenia” vision as a mandate to be tested at the polls, but the political cost of further concessions could be steep.
In Azerbaijan, Aliyev faces less domestic pressure, as the conflict with Armenia remains a unifying force. His reluctance to highlight the benefits of peace and his aggressive rhetoric suggest that he sees little urgency in signing the treaty, believing Azerbaijan has already secured its key objectives. This asymmetry in priorities—Armenia’s need for stability versus Azerbaijan’s strategic patience—complicates negotiations.
A Precarious Path Forward
The Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal represents a historic opportunity to end decades of conflict, but its success hinges on overcoming significant hurdles. The Zangezur Corridor, constitutional amendments, and escalating ceasefire violations underscore the deep mistrust between the two nations. Geopolitical rivalries, particularly Russia’s potential to disrupt the process, and domestic pressures, especially in Armenia, further cloud the outlook. While Pashinyan’s concessions have brought the treaty within reach, Azerbaijan’s preconditions and belligerent rhetoric raise doubts about its commitment to peace. As Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan stated on April 15, 2025, Yerevan is ready to sign and dissolve the OSCE Minsk Group simultaneously, but without reciprocal goodwill from Baku, the South Caucasus risks sliding back into conflict. The international community, particularly the EU and the U.S., must apply sustained pressure to ensure that this fragile opportunity for peace does not slip away.
[Image Credit: Generated by OpenAI’s DALL·E]
Asya Gasparyan is a PhD Student at the School of International Studies (SIS) at the University of Trento. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from the Yerevan State University of the Republic of Armenia (2021-2023). She was a former intern at the MFA of Armenian and a Research Fellow at the Regional Studies Center (Yerevan). The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.
Read the full article here