Having unilaterally suspended EU accession plans until 2028, Tbilisi could seek entry into the semi-formal, Russian-led alliance as a means of strengthening their hand if and when negotiations with Brussels resume.
A month after being voted back into office on Oct. 26, the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party decided to freeze EU membership talks for at least four years amid mounting pressure exerted on them by the supranational bloc to repeal a controversial, Kremlin-inspired “foreign agents bill” and anti-LGBTQ+ legislation that flew in the face of European values. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze’s rationale behind opposing premature EU admission was Georgia being perceived as a freeloading, beggar state and robbed of its dignity. Kobakhidze also claimed that Tbilisi would reject EU subsidies and grants in the interim period so as to afford GD greater manoeuvrability and autonomy on the international relations front. Georgia’s inevitable foreign policy reconfiguration might lead to closer alignment with BRICS, if not full-fledged membership.
With the exception of re-opening diplomatic missions, bilateral Russo-Georgian ties are, for all intents and purposes, on the mend. The reinstatement of direct flights in mid-2023 coupled with the mutual abolition of visa requirements shortly thereafter means citizens of Russia and Georgia enjoy unfettered access to each other’s countries for de facto indefinite stays. The ease of back and forth travel has not just given rise to heightened commercial dealings but also the widespread dissemination of Kremlin-fuelled propaganda and talking points by local Georgian broadcasters including Imedi TV, the “Alliance of Patriots” party’s PR wing Obieqtivi and now defuct Alt-Info. Over and above their warped characterisation of the Collective West as a “Global War Party”, GD’s pledge to avoid a second conflagration with Russia that the United National Movement (UNM) would have sleepwalked into if elected did resonate strongly with Georgian commoners outside the urban centres. Being affiliated with BRICS is simply an extension of this appeasement strategy.
Prior to the House of Assad’s sudden collapse in Syria last December, Türkiye was considered a frontrunner for BRICS candidacy. However, in addition to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan reigniting tensions with both Russia and Iran by openly backing the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) lightening offensive and ensuing power grab, bad blood still persists between Ankara and other existing BRICS members. India would almost certainly have vetoed Türkiye’s membership bid as a result of the latter’s outspokenness on the dire humanitarian situation in Kashmir and its favouritism towards arch-rival Pakistan. The Emiratis and Egyptians are no friends of the Turks either owing to Erdoğan’s unflinching support for the Muslim Brotherhood movement that poses a clear and present danger to dictatorships across the Arab World. Georgia, on the other hand, would be a far more palatable BRICS invitee and have no trouble securing the seal of approval of all ten participants. China, in particular, is bound to welcome the South Caucasian country with open arms. Multi-faceted Sino-Georgian cooperation underpinned by the ‘Middle Corridor’ will scale new heights if Tbilisi ends up acceding to BRICS and abandoning its Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
As an illiberal, non-functioning democracy, by no means would Georgia be a misfit or outlier amongst fellow hybrid regimes that are part of BRICS like India, Brazil and Indonesia. Moreover, GD’s ‘pay-to-play’ approach renders their leadership an easy mark for external actors looking to buy influence in the Black Sea nation. The UAE announcing a record $6 billion investment in Tbilisi, Batumi and Gonio – an amount equivalent to 20% of Georgia’s GDP – during Kobakhidze’s working trip to Abu Dhabi last week is a case in point. This unprecedented capital injection against the backdrop of growing internal strife and social polarisation is being packaged and sold to GD’s domestic audience as a tangible benefit derived from looking beyond Europe. In light of Western funding fast drying up, the availability of low-interest credit lines from the Asian Development Bank and BRICS’ New Development Bank (NDB) for infrastructure development could turbocharge Georgia’s eastward pivot. The construction of a new “ultra-modern” international airport on the capital’s outskirts is symptomatic of GD’s determination to fully leverage their country’s enviable location and tap into key emerging markets instead of focusing disproportionately on Europe.
Needless to say, Tbilisi is situated within a one- to five-hour flight radius of four legacy BRICS capitals – namely Abu Dhabi, Moscow, New Delhi and Tehran – as well as the northwestern Chinese city of Ürümqi to which a direct routes exist. The same argument holds for post-Soviet “partner states” like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Belarus, whose national carriers fly regularly to Shota Rustaveli International Airport and on a seasonal basis to Batumi. From GD’s standpoint, enhancing air connectivity and fostering people-to-people exchanges with the Global South is conducive to ridding Georgia’s so-called “Erasmus Generation” of their Eurocentric worldview. At the same time, inbound arrivals from neighbouring, non-EU jurisdictions are a much-needed cash cow for Georgia’s tourism-dependent economy. In stark contrast to predominantly budget-conscious European visitors, holidaymakers from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), for instance, spend more lavishly on accommodation, excursions, dining and other travel-related incidentals.
By virtue of buying into Putin’s narrative that the EU is an irrelevant body entirely at the United States’ mercy, GD essentially ran out the clock on Joe Biden’s presidency in order to get back in the West’s good graces. Donald Trump has a penchant for singing the praises of and getting along famously with like-minded strongmen such as CCP Chairman Xi Jinping, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman (MbS) and Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban. Yet, the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party and, in particular, its reclusive billionaire founder Bidzina Ivanishvili do not feature prominently on the current U.S administration’s radar. The fact that Salome Zurabishvili was invited to Trump’s inauguration after forcibly stepping down as president reflects a lack of political will on the part of Washington to breathe new life into the scrapped U.S-Georgia strategic partnership. Kobakhidze’s hopes of resurrecting this agreement will likely be further dampened by Cuban-born Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who is a staunch human rights advocate and especially hawkish towards China and Russia. GD’s overtly pro-Kremlin leanings are therefore set to remain a major stumbling block going forward, notwithstanding the Republicans’ shared abhorrence of the decadent postmodernism supposedly plaguing most Western societies.
Already out of favour with the White House, Georgia will not be deterred from throwing its hat into the ring by Trump’s repeated threat to impose “100% tariffs” on allies and foes alike that join BRICS. After all, Indonesia – the group’s newest entrant – faced no such punitive action upon making the cut earlier this year. If anything and given Trump’s preference for dialogue with Iran as opposed to waging a “maximum pressure 2.0” campaign, Georgia could position itself as a potential peace broker if a ‘Grand Bargain’ with the Islamic Republic is ultimately sought. It is worth recalling that Kobakhidze frequented Tehran twice last summer for the late Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s funeral and the subsequent inauguration of his replacement Masoud Pezeshkian. Moreover, the Hamas-instigated ‘Operation Al-Aqsa Flood’ lay bare chief mediator Qatar’s tendency to deliberately drag out discussions on the release of Israeli hostages for self-serving purposes. Georgia, in this regard, could be looked upon as a good-faith interlocutor compared to the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms that are less altruistically-driven and more consumed with elevating their international stature by acting as go-betweens or arranging prisoner swaps.
Meanwhile, Brussels’ fecklessness and horse-trading when it comes to the enforcement of targeted, watertight sanctions risks sucking the oxygen out of ongoing, pro-freedom demonstrations. EU lawmakers have contended themselves with paying mere lip service to the noble cause Georgian youth are putting their lives on the line for. Their recent decision to rescind visa waivers for diplomatic and service passport holders is the latest example of hollow virtue-signalling, not least since all Georgian public servants, including GD officials, also have ordinary passports and are still able to enter the Schengen Area freely in a private capacity. Equally frustrating for Georgia’s overwhelming Europhile populace was the sheer length of time Ivanishvili had to withdraw and stash away his ill-gotten wealth from Western financial institutions before being blacklisted by the United States. Bracing himself for the same fate, Tbilisi mayor and GD functionary Kakha Kaladze followed suit by closing all his European bank accounts.
It is high time Europe wised up to the fact that they are in a bidding war with ‘Greater Eurasia’ over Georgia’s future and took draconian measures to ensure GD sees the light and reorients itself towards the West. The EU needs to do some serious soul-searching on whether locking up peripheral aspirants in the waiting room and throwing away the keys is the way forward. Gone are the days of candidate countries blindly bending to Brussels’ will and entertaining its maximalist demands with alternative, up-and-coming associations like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) willing to bypass bureaucratic hurdles and absorb newcomers in short order. The sooner the Eurocrats realise they are no longer the only show in town, the better.
[Photo by Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, via Wikimedia Commons]
Saahil Menon is an investment analyst based in Dubai. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.
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