Junta Boss Min Aung Hlaing’s recent visit to Moscow lay bare his embattled regime’s direction of travel and signalled a new chapter in Russo-Burmese relations.
During a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Grand Kremlin Palace earlier this month, Myanmar’s self-appointed head of state Min Aung Hlaing fawned over his opposite number whom he likened to a king from a Buddhist folk tale and voiced support for the ongoing “special military operation” against Ukraine. Putin, in turn, heralded the 40% uptick in year-on-year bilateral trade and acknowledged the six elephant calves Senior General Hlaing had gifted Russia as a token of appreciation for the Sukhoi Su-30 Fighter Jets delivered to Myanmar’s Air Forces on January 10th. Just last week, Naypyidaw hosted a multipolarity-themed Think Tank Forum where the State Administration Council (SAC) chairman parroted Kremlin-inspired talking points on the emergence of a new, more equitable world order and how his basket case of a nation stands to benefit from such an advent. Not only does Myanmar happen to be the weakest link and something of a black sheep within the ASEAN bloc, but it is increasingly viewed as a problem child by bigger neighbours like China and India that have borne the brunt of its dire humanitarian crisis.
Needless to say, the country has devolved into a cesspool of criminality and lawlessness ever since the Tatmadaw-led putsch four years ago dislodged and subsequently imprisoned the National League for Democracy (NLD) leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Once the darling of the West, Myanmar’s most iconic freedom fighter has been written off as damaged goods by much of the international community and left to languish under house arrest. Suu Kyi’s wilful blindness vis-à-vis – if not tacit endorsement of – the Rohingya genocide whilst serving as Myanmar’s State Counsellor precipitated her fall from grace and even drew condemnation from her fellow Nobel laureates. Overseeing and justifying the incarceration of two high-profile Reuters journalists in December 2017 made matters worse for the ailing human rights activist and prompted Western elites to wash their hands off her entirely. Myanmar now finds itself mired in a full-blown civil war with roughly 42% of its territory controlled by the guerrilla “Three Brotherhood Alliance” and Min Aung Hlaing’s armed forces on their last legs.
By throwing its weight behind the atrophied Burmese strongman, Russia risks encountering the same sunk cost fallacy it succumbed to in Ba’athist Syria and worse still, suffering yet another foreign policy humiliation if its point man in Naypyidaw is turfed out by pro-democracy rebels. That said, the Kremlin remains bent on exploiting Myanmar’s ‘non-relationship’ with the United States and Euro-Atlantic writ large. Unlike other ASEAN members that have conflicting East-West interests and cannot therefore align themselves lock, stock, and barrel with either camp, decades of isolation and crippling Western-led sanctions leave Myanmar no choice but to gravitate towards the Sino-Russian orbit for the sake of keeping its economy viable. As far as the enlargement of BRICS is concerned, Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa are key geographies of focus. The fact that this semi-formal grouping has morphed into a free-for-all motley of failed states, theocratic dictatorships and illiberal democracies means any third country, however dysfunctional or impoverished, with an anti-Western ideological bent can qualify for fast-track membership. Myanmar, in this regard, is low-hanging fruit – arguably even more so than existing partners within the regional vicinity, such as Thailand and Malaysia.
From Putin’s standpoint, Russian-dominated intergovernmental structures – be it BRICS+, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) or the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) – are merely a means to an end. He is ultimately angling for a confluence of the aforementioned associations and seeking to establish a pan-Eurasian security architecture that rivals NATO. The Tatmadaw’s imposition of martial law in February 2024 has made overseas travel especially cumbersome for fighting-age inhabitants and given rise to people smuggling rings across the ‘Golden Triangle’. Although Thailand has been a major beneficiary of the ensuing capital flight from an already cash-strapped Myanmar, local authorities’ patience with Burmese draft dodgers is wearing thin not least since they are believed to pose a clear and present danger to the Kingdom’s national security.
Despite initially backing Min Aung Hlaing, Beijing has likewise grown frustrated at the junta’s inability to keep a lid on the ‘scam centre’ empire thousands of Chinese citizens have fallen prey to and prevent internal chaos from spilling over into mainland China. For those in war-torn Myanmar with enough surplus funds to bribe their way out of the country, Russia is among the few remaining destinations easily accessible to them. With Naypyidaw having waived short-stay visa requirements for Russian passport holders, it is only a matter of time before Moscow responds in kind amid its post-war tourism push. Following the mass exodus of ill-treated Central Asian guest workers, Russia has begun sourcing blue-collar labour from Myanmar, 25 of whom arrived there at the start of the month to undertake jobs in the construction sector. Furthermore, it is no secret that developing and populating the Russian Far East has long been a domestic priority for Putin. The ASEAN nations, which boast an expanding middle class and continue to bolster direct air connectivity with Siberia, are regarded as indispensable allies in this pursuit. It is worth recalling that Myanmar sent one of the largest overseas delegations to last year’s Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok and recently opened a Consulate-General in Novosibirsk.
Make no mistake, Russia’s big bet on Myanmar, which includes nuclear cooperation and agreeing to build a 110 MW small modular reactor (SMR) just outside the capital – is aimed at expanding its ‘near abroad’ beyond the post-Soviet space. Min Aung Hlaing’s preparedness to reduce his country to a client state of the Kremlin and help Russia overcome its acute manpower shortage, whether on the battlefield or elsewhere, suggests this gambit could bear fruit provided, of course, that he maintains power.
[Photo by DALL·E]
Saahil Menon is an investment analyst based in Dubai. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.
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