As the third anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine passes, Kazakhstan finds itself in an increasingly precarious geopolitical position. Trump is seeking to end the war through a strategy that prioritizes U.S. economic and geopolitical interests. In addition to the critical minerals deal, he recently claimed the country’s nuclear power plants for the United States. Trump’s transactional approach to peace raises concerns about the long-term sovereignty and economic independence of Ukraine, as well as the broader implications for regional and global security.
Any peace ‘deal’ if concluded would require both Russia and Ukraine to make concessions from their current positions, however, the U.S. has more leverage over Ukraine than Russia to pressure it to make major concessions. This will strengthen Moscow’s position on the global stage, and its influence over Central Asia and Kazakhstan will be further increased.
A war that reshaped Kazakhstan’s foreign policy
Kazakhstan has historically pursued a “multi-vector” foreign policy, balancing relations with Russia, China, Western countries, and its regional neighbors. However, since 2022, this approach has been significantly constrained. The war in Ukraine and subsequent Western sanctions against Russia have forced Kazakhstan into a difficult balancing act, as it seeks to avoid antagonizing either Moscow or Washington.
From the start of the war, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev undertook a series of steps to distance Kazakhstan from Russia. He publicly announced that Kazakhstan will not recognize Luhansk and Donetsk regions, stated adherence and respect to international law and norms, as well as strengthened enforcement to abide by Western sanctions. He also made symbolic gestures to distance Kazakhstan from Russia, such as speaking in Kazakh instead of Russian during official meetings with Vladimir Putin at the Forum of Interregional Cooperation in Astana on November 10, 2023. However, in practice, Kazakhstan remains deeply tied to Russia, particularly in economic and security matters.
Kazakhstan and China initiated a closer rapprochement since the start of the war, which has been a part of a larger balancing act vis-à-vis Russia. In an unusual for China rare public statement, President Xi made his first foreign visit in April 2022 announcing that China will continue to strongly support Kazakhstan in defending its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity to ensure political stability and economic development, and oppose the interference of any forces in the internal affairs of the country, clearly aiming the message to Moscow. The institutionalization of the C+C5 (China plus Central Asia) dialogue through the historical signing of the Xi’an Declaration in May 2023 reflects this shift, signaling Beijing’s growing commitment to the region.
Economic consequences: a double-edged sword
The war has intensified Kazakhstan’s economic integration with Russia, often in ways that undermine its sovereignty. Russia’s control over Kazakhstan’s Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which handles nearly 80% of Kazakh oil exports, has made Astana very vulnerable. Repeated disruptions on the CPC, including from drone attacks in the middle of March this year, stressed the importance for Kazakhstan to diversify its transportation routes.
Second, Tokayev could not resist Russian pressure to further the economic integration of strategic assets. In 2022, he allowed Rosatom to purchase a 49% stake in the Budenovskoye uranium mining pit, soon to supply the world’s 10% output. Two years later, in 2024, Tokayev conducted a façade democracy referendum to build a nuclear power plant, with Rosatom as the most likely winner. Russia is scheduled to build another three coal plants in Kazakhstan and recently signed a natural gas deal to supply the northern regions of Kazakhstan.
Beyond oil, gas, and uranium, Russian small and medium businesses have flooded into Kazakhstan due to Western sanctions, seeking to reestablish supply chains and avoid economic isolation. By the end of 2022, the number of Russian-owned companies in Kazakhstan grew by 68%, particularly in IT and trade. While this has spurred economic activity, it has also made Kazakhstan more dependent on Russian economic interests.
Sanctions on Russia have also harmed Kazakhstan, driving inflation to 20.3% in 2022 before declining to 8% in 2024. This was achieved partially through the record-high stabilization injection of reserves from the National Fund—4.6 trillion tenge (approximately $9.2 billion).
In 2023, exports from Kazakhstan to Russia hit a record $9.78 billion, fueled in part by Kazakhstan’s re-exports of household commodities as well as concerns about re-export of dual-use items like drones, engines, and computer components. Although exports rose, imports from Russia to Kazakhstan actually decreased by $1.2 billion between 2022 and 2023, revealing an ailing Russian economy bogged down by war and sanctions.
However, not all effects of the war have been negative. Kazakhstan has benefited from increased trade along the Middle Corridor (Trans-Caspian International Transport Route), which bypasses Russia, linking China to Europe via Central Asia and the Caucasus. This has positioned Kazakhstan as a key transit hub in Eurasian trade.
Security challenges and military adjustments
The war in Ukraine has fundamentally altered Kazakhstan’s security landscape. Kazakhstan is a member of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and remains constrained by its CSTO obligations not to have a military treaty with other countries. Nevertheless, President Tokayev sought to diversify Kazakhstan’s defense partnerships, deepening military cooperation with Turkey. In 2022, Tokayev signed agreements on joint drone production and intelligence sharing with Ankara.
Four months before the start of the war, Kazakhstan enhanced its military doctrine. The doctrine foresaw the need to develop infrastructure to increase troop mobility and respond to modern threats due to technological advancements that have changed war tactics. Kazakhstan has also increased its defense spending by 50% in 2022, 11.6% in 2023, and 8.8% in 2024.
The Trump factor: what a second term means for Kazakhstan
Trump’s return to the White House has bolstered Putin’s position, increasing the likelihood of a scenario in which Russia will emerge from the war as the winner that achieved its foreign policy goals, such as deterring Ukraine from joining NATO. This would embolden Moscow’s regional ambitions, putting additional pressure on Kazakhstan.
Under Trump, U.S. engagement in Central Asia has already begun to decline. USAID-funded projects in Kazakhstan—many focused on civil society and countering Russian disinformation—have been scaled back or shut down. The future of the C5+1 dialogue between Central Asia and the U.S. remains uncertain.
If Washington’s influence in Central Asia diminishes, Kazakhstan will be forced to lean more heavily on China and the European Union. Beijing has already signaled its commitment, incorporating Central Asia into its vision of a “shared future for mankind” through the Xi’an Declaration signed in May 2023. The EU, particularly France and Germany, has also deepened economic ties with Kazakhstan, offering an alternative to overreliance on China or Russia.
The road ahead: what Kazakhstan must do
With Putin, Xi, and Trump all set to remain in power through at least 2029, Kazakhstan’s leadership must prepare for an extended period of geopolitical turbulence. Tokayev’s ability to maintain stability will depend on several key strategies:
- Reduce economic dependence on Russia: Expanding trade partnerships with the EU, Turkey, and the Middle Corridor nations will be crucial. Developing alternative oil export routes, such as through the Caspian Sea, should be a priority.
- Enhance national security: Strengthening Kazakhstan’s defense capabilities and deepening cooperation with Turkey and China could serve as deterrents against Russian coercion.
- Bolster domestic resilience: Addressing inflation, housing costs, and income disparities will be essential to maintaining social stability.
- Resist Russian political influence: Ensuring information sovereignty by countering Kremlin-backed disinformation campaigns and reinforcing Kazakh national identity will be critical.
- Engage with the U.S. and EU: Even if Trump deprioritizes Central Asia, Kazakhstan should continue engaging with Washington and Brussels to maintain diplomatic flexibility.
The next four years will be a critical test of Kazakhstan’s sovereignty, economic resilience, and diplomatic agility. While the war in Ukraine has reinforced Kazakhstan’s vulnerabilities, it has also created new opportunities, particularly through deeper engagement with China and Europe. Tokayev’s government must act decisively to secure Kazakhstan’s position in a rapidly shifting global order. Tokayev has a window of opportunity as Russia will be inherently weakened by the war and will need to undertake a rebuilding and rehabilitation process, likely spanning at least five to ten years. Kazakhstan must capitalize on this period and diligently pursue multivector diplomacy and diversification while exerting its independence and sovereignty. Failure to do so could see Kazakhstan increasingly trapped in Russia’s economic and geopolitical orbit, with diminishing prospects for an independent foreign policy.
[Photo by DALL·E]
Dr. Chan Young Bang is the founder and President of KIMEP University, Principal Investigator at the DPRK Strategic Research Center, and a former economic adviser to Nursultan Nazarbayev, the first President of Kazakhstan. His current research focuses on nuclear non-proliferation and the economic development of the DPRK (North Korea). He is the author of more than 65 articles and nine books on the global prospects for achieving peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula. His latest English-language books include Transition Beyond Denuclearization: A Bold Challenge for Kim Jong Un and A Korean Peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons: Perspectives on Socioeconomic Development which were published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2020 and 2023, respectively.
Dr. Anar Shaikenova is a senior researcher in the DPRK Strategic Research Center at KIMEP University, Kazakhstan, and an assistant professor in the Department of Public Administration. Before joining the Ph.D. program, she worked with USAID, the Asian Development Bank and the U.S. Department of State EXBS Program on strategic trade controls in Kazakhstan and in the Central Asian region. Dr Shaikenova has a Ph.D. in public policy from Nazarbayev University and an MA in public administration from the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, U.S. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors.
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