I was searching for a word, a combination of ‘old’ and ‘new,’ to best describe leaders who typify the current scenario not just in Syria, but across the Middle East. Evergreen, timeless, and different combinations of old and new are all words that I considered. However, the word ‘classic’ resonated with how I wanted to look at the Middle East, in context of the adage ‘old product, new packaging.’ The man I want to talk about is a classic Syrian savior.
This classic savior of Syria is a militant leader with a ten-million-dollar price tag on his head. He has been an al-Qaeda franchise leader, battled Americans in Iraq, and deployed suicide bombers in Syria. He has given interviews for international media, even after being designated a terrorist by the West. He was Islamic State’s number one man in Syria until he betrayed them, becoming the top commander for al-Qaeda in Syria, later abandoning them as well.
Meet Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, who is being credited with leading the Syrian victory unfolding right now across our TV screens.
Born as Ahmed Hussein Al-Sharaa in Damascus in 1982, Jawlani was inspired by the narrative of Intifada all his life. Even his nom de guerre symbolizes the Golan Heights, a Syrian territory that has been under Israeli occupation. Jawlani started earning his jihadist credentials with al-Qaeda in Iraq, led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who Jawlani claims to have never met. Perhaps that is true, as Jawlani was just 23 when Zarqawi was killed by the Americans, but Jawlani cannot truly feign ignorance about the newly evolving Islamic State in Iraq.
Jawlani was interred at Camp Bucca, an American camp holding about 100,000 prisoners, which paradoxically served as a finishing school for the top leadership of IS and their future commanders. Disenfranchised Ba’ath Party members, Iraq’s disbanded army, police and national guards, budding jihadist clerics, and promising commanders like Jawlani rubbed shoulders, in camp Bucca’s utopia of militant brotherhood. Six years later, in 2012, two years after his release from Camp Bucca, Jawlani was leading a charge into Syria at the behest of IS supreme leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, as one of his top commanders. It is safe to say he was not exactly a militant nobody by then.
By then, Baghdadi had come into conflict with al-Qaeda for a surprising reason: Baghdadi’s organization was simply too extreme and violent for al-Qaeda. That one statement alone demonstrates how violent Islamic State had been at their height; even Al-Qaeda did not want IS to keep up their trademark cruelty, because it foresaw that IS would soon lose the hearts and minds of Muslim masses. Baghdadi did not pay any heed, stating that Al- Qaeda was simply a franchise of Daawat ul Islamiyah, not the other way around. Baghdadi then sent suicide bombers against al Qaeda leadership in Iraq.
This is the nursery Jawlani came from, and he was not just any foot soldier, but Baghdadi’s top commander in Syria, before splitting from IS and defecting to al-Qaeda. Jawlani’s organization, Jabhat al-Nusra, is on record for sending suicide bombers and perpetrating the same brand of cruelty as IS, albeit less so on fellow militants.
Jawlani’s Jabhat al-Nusra had by then in its possession arsenals of American weapons sent by the US to different anti-Assad groups, which al-Nusra had either defeated or amalgamated into its ranks. A ‘classic’ conspiracy theory of that time states that Americans supplied weapons directly to Nusra.
Jawlani’s hallmark has been suicide missions, sending young men wearing suicide vests, a tactic he himself adopted while crossing into Syria from Iraq, just in case he was captured en-route. Nusra became a symbol of resistance in Syria, so much so that when the US designated it as a terrorist organization, many Syrian opposition groups rebutted this vehemently.
Under Jawlani Nusra grew in popularity, not just for militant credentials but also for ostensibly attempting to provide food and security for civilians, classically emulating the Muslim brotherhood model. It was funded heavily by sympathizers in Gulf states, but had other, shadier means of income, like kidnapping for ransom of foreigners. Nusra has also, undeniably, attacked Syrian minorities under Jawlani’s leadership, a practice also classically inherited from IS.
Nusra is on record for sending large payments to Baghdadi when IS was slaying people left, right, and center in Iraq. However, what followed was essentially a classic grab for leadership, and perhaps egos. Baghdadi grew wary of Nusra’s popularity, and in 2013, announced the end of Nusra, subsuming it into the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria—ISIS. A lot of the jealousy was about money; Nusra was raking in cash, but Baghdadi was not sure he was getting all of it. Nusra had positioned itself strategically and had become quite affluent- Baghdadi wanted it all.
Jawlani didn’t like that—he had done all the heavy lifting, and now Baghdadi was going to get the spoils? Not if Jawlani could help it! The split would become public knowledge around 2014, when Baghdadi took the Syrian strategic stronghold of Raqqa from al-Nusra. At this time, Baghdadi announced Al-Nusra, and Jawlani officially split with him, joining Al Qaeda, a classical game of musical chairs. Jawlani had bene deeply entrenched in Syria, holding together the anti- Assad collation of militant groups against Assad.
Then the Russians entered the fray in support of Assad. Nusra went all out against this, prompting Russian carpet bombing of Idlib, killing scores of civilians and creating massive displacement. Jawlani retaliated by causing massive Alawite casualties, many of them civilians. Just so we are clear on semantics; killing innocent non-combatants or civilians for a political purpose, is a classic definition of terrorism.
Since Russians based their counter-retaliation narrative on Jawlani’s Al-Qaeda credentials, Jawlani officially severed ties with al-Qaeda in 2016, to remove the stigma and give his movement more of a ‘homeland liberation’ feel. This is also quite a classic move favored by militant entities: to rebrand into nationalist groups, despite having a clear-cut, ideologically aligned agenda.
Jawlani also adopted a classic hegemonic posture on all violence in the area under his control, by attacking almost all other groups opposed to him- Ahrar al-Sham, al-Qaeda, Hurras al-Din, ISIS, Free Syrian Army—almost everybody. But beyond this, Jawlani needed to appear more of a ‘man of the people.’ This is a classical case study in how top tier militant commanders transform themselves at the pinnacle of their careers, perhaps sensing greatness in their grasp?
Jawlani joined a coalition of factions called Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS, in 2017. HTS have been running Syria’s Salvation Government, or SSG, which essentially supplies municipal services, all under Sharia law. Democracy has no place in his social setup, and neither do minorities, in Al-Jawlani’s worldview. Idlib saw progress , albeit as an area strictly controlled through Jawlani’s Sharia law, especially as Turkish money flowed in. However, Jawlani did have problems. Turkey’s affection for him waned after Jawlani tried to take over Turkish territory in northern Syria, while in March 2024, there were widespread public protests against al-Jawlani’s rule.
Perhaps because of this pressure, but even before that, Jawlani had been on a charm offensive wooing the world. As Russia had to divert attention to Ukraine which diluted its Syrian presence, and Turkey stepped in to facilitate toppling of the Assad regime, Jawlani, logically, seemed the poster boy for this great victory. Now, he is promoting slogans like ‘diversity is a strength’ and ‘together we will return.’
What happens in Syria now? Will it slip into the classic great games in the middle East? Will the advancing IDF and Tukey carve out areas, or will Iran do something unexpected through its proxies? Will classic attrition wars start between the long oppressed Sunni majority of Syria and the Shias, as they did after US invasion in neighboring Iraq? Will HTS start squabbling amongst themselves and other groups for Syrian oil reserves, even as global powers position themselves around newly emerging proxy powers in the country? Or, will Syria return to some semblance of peace, ushering in a new era, as the liberation forces have been declaring? What remains true thus far; this region has a classical history of saviours, persons and countries, who declared their intentions to ‘save’ it from itself, and we all know what happened afterwards.
[Photo by Wikimedia Commons]
Manzar Zaidi is a security consultant and academic. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.
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