In a multipolar world vastly different from the immediate aftermath of the Cold War period, different actors on the world stage threaten America’s influence in a way unprecedented since 1945. A country’s potential rise or decline can be ascertained by deep diving into the state of culture, education, economy, diplomacy, and of course, the state of the military. The examples in this paper deal with geopolitical decisions combined with hard and soft power calculations. It attempts to view the past to help predict the future and list out effective first steps to prevent America’s downfall. It examines the short-term alternatives of what America can and should do to maintain its influence and dominance around the globe as the indecisiveness of the last thirty years of ill-informed policies are pointing America off the global cliff.
The discussions and actions on what America “should do” are critical, yet there is much repetitiveness on what the “should” must be. What options does America have to recover its role around the globe and maintain its influence in the long run? Unless drastic changes are made to its execution of foreign policy, the future looks bleak. President Donald Trump’s now two elections to the presidency and his directive on “America first” is a part of the answer as to the options that America has and the direction in which the vector may be headed.
A measured step back which would allow one to regain one’s strength to come back on a better day needs to be explored at the state level. The steps are multifold, and while there are risks involved, they can be turned into calculated risks that would produce a better outcome than the seemingly lackluster direction heretofore. It is time to bring back realpolitik, something America did well throughout the majority of its history. In facing the current dire reality, realpolitik is used to mean understanding one’s position clearly, strengths and weaknesses on “the grand chessboard” and with a clear self-reflection of what it can and cannot do at any given time, where it will come short if a given step is taken. Absent a kinetic war with the PRC in this decade, America can change things in the short term which will help contribute to long-term success. Admittedly, a major war with great power in this decade will throw a wrench at much of what this paper offers.
America has lost its ability to deter an adversary far less formidable than its primary ones delineated in its strategic documents: the Houthis. Since October 2023 shipping has been under attack in the Red Sea. While America’s navy has acted heroically, the means have not met the necessary ends leading an enormous number of merchant vessels to not take the risk of going through the Bab-el-Mandeb straits, instead by going through the more expensive route around the horn of Africa. While Clausewitz’s writing that “war is the continuation of politics by other means” is correct for the Houthis, America has not ensured for that phrase to be correct for itself.
The disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan was not the first instance leading to America’s loss of deterrence, but the last great instance. That decision likely contributed to Putin’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, yet there are a series of other instances that took place prior to it. To name a few, the Afghanistan debacle was preceded by the Obama Administration’s inaction when he failed to uphold the “red line” against Assad and failed to act against Putin when he invaded Crimea. It was preceded by the Bush Administration’s inaction when Putin invaded Georgia. It was preceded by the Clinton administration’s failure in dealing with the rise of extremists before they could attack America. The loss of deterrence did not occur because of one mistake, but many through the passage of over thirty years. In his farewell speech at the Pentagon in 2006, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made known one of the “Rumsfeld Rules,” saying that “not only is weakness provocative, but the perception of weakness on our part can be provocative as well.” Unfortunately, as it pertains to America of the last three decades, that quote has aged like fine wine.
The question is why did presidents time and again fail to respond accordingly to these crises? While many of these mistakes were made mainly due to a lack of vision, there can be no doubt that inadequate resourcing was a part of the calculus too. Imagine America’s economy, diplomatic savvy and military might multiple times greater than what it was or is, much of these “pivots” or premature “withdrawals” may not have even happened. Possibly, these presidents hoped that their inactions would somehow not affect America’s deterrent power. However, hope and politics do not mix well together. It is reasonable to conclude that in all instances America mostly failed to deter simply because it was not able due to being overstretched in its seemingly endless commitments around the globe.
Now is the time for America to go back to the basics and rebuild its foreign policy foundation. America should lessen its commitments around the globe at least in the short term, which in blunt terms means taking a step back. The list of actions has four parts: to give assurances to allies that would not shift significantly from administration to administration; better fund the State Department, strengthen diplomatic ties and sign security treaties; reform and appropriately fund the Pentagon; prioritize America’s security over all else. These actions will help accomplish two main goals: first, bring back deterrence and credibility for America; second, maintain America’s dominant role in the major corners of the world in the long run.
Presently, America needs to make assurances to allies that it will stand with them if attacked and demand them to reciprocate that level of commitment. And this assurance should not be limited to the “Nixon Doctrine” and “the threat of a major power involving nuclear weapons” but other conventional threats as well. Abandoning allies will give a huge boost to the enemies, moreover, those former allies may very well join the axis of the enemies.
There is good reason for optimism that the alliances will stand and can be made stronger, largely due to widespread consensus on foreign policy issues and America’s continued influence around the globe. In the grand scheme of things, American foreign policy has changed little in the last ten or so years and through three different administrations. For instance, the PRC threat has been prioritized at the highest levels of national security; America has supported Israel; Ukraine has received American support constantly; advocated for withdrawal from Afghanistan and maintain as little footprint in the Middle East as possible; expanded and strengthened NATO; none have been a friend of Russia. Therefore, for once in recent times, there is a great chance to build consensus with allies on foreign policy issues that at least in America there seems to be bipartisan support rather consistently. In his book Diplomacy, Henry Kissinger wrote of the dangers of the lack of domestic support for foreign policy, saying that “democracy cannot conduct a serious foreign policy if the contending factions within it do not exercise a minimum of restraint toward each other.” If within America there is a broad consensus on these issues, as the nation with the most allies, it cannot fail to grasp the opportunity to stress the importance for the allies to step up and ensure that they are punching above their weight.
Far too long, America has been the guarantor of the security of dozens of nations around the globe. This tendency has gone on for nearly a hundred years, arguably since America’s intervention in WWI. While there will be those who believe that the course should remain steady, it is simply not sustainable. America’s resources are not infinite. If the allies realize that America may not be there at least in the short term with the same power as in the past, it will prompt them to spend more, sacrifice more, contribute more to their defense, and stop buck-passing. They will be the foremost beneficiaries of those actions.
American diplomacy should make two concrete intents clear to its allies. First, it is not abandoning them but simply pulling back some of its might, leaving them to contribute more. Second, convey that its actions are prompted by the urge and need for self-preservation; that if they and America are to succeed in the long run, America’s pivot should first be back to itself. As a case in point, the war in Ukraine has led all countries of Europe to take their security more seriously as “after major surges in their defense budgets, U.S. allies on the continent now spend 18 percent more than they did a year ago, a far greater increase than the United States’. More than two-thirds of NATO members now meet or exceed the alliance’s target of spending at least two percent of GDP on defense.” If anything, President Trump’s comments on NATO and his commitments to Europe have helped remind the Europeans that Europe is a continent that needs to be protected primarily by Europeans. Also, NATO allies fully realize that America’s focus is not on Europe, but on East Asia. They realize America cannot be strong everywhere equally.
America must capitalize on expanding its diplomatic influence. Diplomacy inherently will be weak if the nation cannot back it up through its other areas of influence. On that note, it is important to remember what General Mattis made clear that “if you do not fund the State Department, I would have to buy more weapons.” Therefore, capitalizing on diplomacy now will be a huge payoff. Currently, America is not fighting foreign wars, nor are the majority of its allies. However, with highly belligerent Russia and China, new security treaties must be examined.
To illustrate, AUKUS is a partnership that was signed under President Biden and will likely continue under President Trump. The partnership is not backed by a security commitment with Australia. As a part of it, America will agree to sell to Australia three to five of the crown jewel of its submarine force, the Virginia-Class submarine. This level of cooperation is unprecedented and the only country it comes close to it, is the United Kingdom. The sale of submarines that will significantly reduce America’s own already low inventory is a commitment of enormous uncalculated risk if it is not backed by a security agreement. Consequently, it is time to back AUKUS with a security treaty with Australia. For what America is willing to give Australia for its security, it is not too much to ask to have a bilateral security treaty. AUKUS-like partnerships must be continued with others, including Japan, Korea and Canada. Moreover, America must use its influence to do the same with “neutral” countries, like India. America at least should make diplomatic overtures in pursuit of bringing them to its camp. America should remind the “neutrals” that while China and Russia have few allies and true friends, America has many and they are significantly more prosperous than the few of the former group.
The methods of funding the military must change. There are thousands of articles and studies proposing ways to do so. America is as extended now as it was during the Cold War, yet the percentage of its GDP dedicated to defense is half of what it was in those years. A DOD report on China predicts that China spends upwards of $450 billion on its defense, significantly greater than what they officially report, and many times greater than what it was spending only at the beginning of this century. “The U.S. government spends nearly $900 billion annually on defense, but considering the total amount of federal spending, the challenges facing the United States, the country’s global military requirements, and the return on investment in hard power, this is not nearly enough,” wrote Senator McConnell.
While significantly increasing defense spending is the right path, it is unlikely to rise appreciably. There is no prospect that the budget will double as a percentage of GDP now or in the foreseeable future. Henceforth, a step back now can have constructive effects especially as allies already are stepping up. As a case in point, if American warships deploy for periods ranging from six-ten months, they can now be reduced to four months. The benefits of shorter deployments will help prioritize ship maintenance, morale, recruitment, etc. This will help the navy do a reset, when America is still at relative peace. These actions will build up the necessary readiness so that when major conflict comes, America’s navy will be “combat surge ready” and deploy quickly to any corner of the world.
As John J. Mearsheimer wrote in his book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, states are rational actors and tend to be a lot more calculated when it comes to their security than they are often given credit for. Amidst the rise of destructive influence of Russia and China, America must prioritize its security. Not to conclude that they are good or bad, but tariffs may be there to ultimately serve that purpose: reduce prosperity but ultimately increase security. Trade is another area, especially with China. A reduction of trade on certain products may result in higher prices for Americans on those products, however, if weakening China will strengthen America’s security, then weakening China must take precedence. “That outcome might not be good for American prosperity, much less global prosperity, but it would be good for American security, which is what matters most,” wrote Mearsheimer. This argument is hard for idealists to agree with, but the realists will require little convincing.
The lessons of history must be heeded to avoid what is known as the “Thucydides trap” to become a reality. America has been going “full steam ahead” for at least a century now yet recently it has been losing its aim. While anything that may in any way be seen as pulling back will be difficult for any elected leader to advocate, only through adaptability to the new reality can America build back the strength to ensure long-term success. The rise of China does not have to be the fall of America. By holding on to its alliances by making them more security-centered, communicating clearly the intent on its commitments with allies, appropriately funding the State and Defense Departments, and prioritizing security can America come out victorious in this century. In the short-term attempting to be strong everywhere at the same time needs to come to a halt. America’s eyesight needs to be regained so it can renew what Zbigniew Brzezinski called “strategic vision.” On momentous occasions when American action mattered, America made mistakes that led to the diminishing of its credibility, however, it is not too late to bring back deterrence and peace through strength. While the journey is fraught with risk, America has options and must act now.
[Photo by Frydolin, via Wikimedia Commons]
Greg Grigoryan is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and a veteran of the surface Navy. He currently serves as the Acting Section Head for Future Ships in OPNAV N95 Expeditionary Warfare Division at the Pentagon. Previously, he worked as a contractor on the AUKUS partnership. His expertise in naval strategy and force development informs his work on shaping the future amphibious force structure for the 2040-2060 timeframe. In recognition of his contributions, he was named the 2024 OPNAV Junior Civilian of the Year. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.
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