For a long time, foreign policy, dominated by trade and economic considerations, was akin to business partnership between countries where each sought relative gains and more advantage than the other. However, following the devastation of the world wars, countries’ partnership deepened into an alliance that involved more interdependence, pursuit of mutual interests, and collective actions. But claims of international politics being perpetually marked by uncertainty and power struggles are increasingly evident today. After decades of collaborative and cooperative diplomacy, countries are now shifting back to a time of transactional statecraft. The relationship between Modi and Trump serves as a prime example of this shift.
India’s Transactional Diplomacy and Biden Administration
India’s foreign policy has long been a transactional diplomacy disguised as strategic autonomy or non-alignment. Through a pragmatic approach, India cultivated transactional relationships, maximizing its benefits from various otherwise contradictory partnerships. For instance, it has successfully navigated a delicate balance between conflicting geopolitical interests, including the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Israel-Iran tensions, and the Russia-China-US rivalry.
Critics argue that India’s multi-alignment strategy and reluctance to commit to formal alliances have irked policymakers in Washington. India is criticized for seeking the benefits of strategic partnerships without deeper commitments. For instance, India’s skepticism about transforming the Quad into a militarized alliance, coupled with its hesitancy to take on a more prominent defense role, has frustrated American policymakers. In response, the US established the SQUAD—comprising Japan, Australia, and the Philippines—as a demonstration of its dissatisfaction, signaling a shift toward strengthening partnerships with other regional powers. Other issues, such as India’s participation in the BRICS+ summit in Russia last year, amid US efforts to isolate Moscow, and its support for de-dollarization in international trade, have also raised concerns.
But the Biden administration often forgo India’s multialignment given its geopolitical importance in countering Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific. It prioritized security and strategic partnership with India and chose not to make these issues a focal point. This was particularly evident in its handling of the India-Russia oil trade as it refrained from imposing sanctions on India or severing diplomatic ties. Furthermore, the administration also proactively secured long-term agreements with India, ensuring continued cooperation on critical issues such as security, defense, and nuclear collaboration.
As Trump assumes office, the strategic partnership between India and the U.S. will morph into a transactional association. Given his commitment to prioritizing American interests both domestically and globally, he is likely to focus on extracting unilateral, maximum, and direct benefits for the U.S. in critical areas like defense, trade, and regional security.
Trump’s quid pro quo
India is one of the few foreign policy priorities in the U.S. that enjoys broad bipartisan support. Both Republican and Democratic administrations have recognized the strategic importance of strengthening ties with India, leading to sustained engagement and collaboration between the two countries. Early on, Trump’s appointment of Mike Waltz, former head of the India Caucus, as his National Security Advisor signaled a priority for Asia and a strong pro-India tilt. Moreover, the strong personal rapport between Trump and Prime Minister Modi, evident during events like ‘Howdy Modi’ and ‘Namaste Trump,’ led to a general optimism in New Delhi on Trump’s victory following the November 2024 presidential elections.
However, the India-U.S. relationship has entered uncharted waters. Trump’s firm positioning against de-dollarization, characterization of India as a trade abuser, threats of reciprocal tariffs, and allegations of USAID involvement in election funding stirred debates about the future of India-US relations. Moreover, early this year, the absence of an invitation for Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the inauguration of U.S. President Donald Trump, especially in light of an invitation extended to Chinese President Xi Jinping, generated considerable discussion within policy circles. Various other state leaders—both allies and non-allies—receiving invitations, sparked speculation about the trajectory of India-US relations under the new Trump administration.
Notwithstanding the speculations, Trump’s recent overtures with China and Russia suggest a clear focus on trade and economic benefits. This emphasis on economic partnerships could unlock new avenues for India in trade, investment, and technology exchanges.
Trump’s second administration is poised to elevate the India-US bilateral relationship to new heights with deeper cooperation and alignment across a range of areas, including defense, technology, trade, and nuclear collaboration, albeit in a transactional manner. Prime Minister Modi’s visit to the White House in February proved to be “substantive and productive”, resulting in several ambitious trade and defense agreements. India’s agreement to purchase more oil from the U.S., along with its consideration of acquiring expensive F-35 jets, coupled with the U.S. not following through on the imposition of reciprocal tariff, serves as a clear example of this dynamic.
As the saying goes, “ if you scratch my back, I will scratch yours.” Modi and Trump’s unconventional foreign policy strategy characterized by a transactional approach will likely fetch favorable returns for both countries, even as it undermines the strategic aspect of their partnership. The U.S. will adamantly pursue tangible benefits for itself wherever possible. But this will also create opportunities for a more flexible and pragmatic engagement with India. For India to benefit from this changing landscape, it will have to adjust to a U.S. that trumps transactional benefits over strategic considerations.
[Photo by Prime Minister’s Office, India, via Wikimedia Commons]
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.
Shivani Pandey is currently a PhD student in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Delaware. Her research interests include Asian populism and multilateralism, India-US relations, and South Asian geopolitics.
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