Foreign Minister Sugiono’s visit to Qatar on March 5, 2025, was a noteworthy but not earth-shattering step in continuing Indonesia’s diplomatic outreach in the Gulf region. While the visit was an important part of reinforcing bilateral ties, it did not mark a major shift in Indonesia’s foreign policy or suggest that its Middle Eastern strategy is undergoing a dramatic change.
The discussions during the visit, which included a meeting with Qatari Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani, focused on strengthening cooperation across various sectors, including defense, infrastructure, and economic collaboration. The visit also addressed broader regional and international issues, with Palestinian sovereignty being a notable point of emphasis. While it was a useful engagement, it should be seen as part of Indonesia’s ongoing diplomatic efforts rather than a groundbreaking development in the country’s Middle Eastern relations.
A central theme of Sugiono’s visit was infrastructure, particularly in light of Qatar’s recent involvement in Indonesia’s ambitious housing initiative. In January 2024, Qatar committed to financing a major housing project in Indonesia, agreeing to fund the construction of one million homes. This was formalized through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by Sheikh Abdulaziz bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, Chairman of Qilaa International Group, and Indonesia’s Minister of Public Works and Public Housing, Maruarar Sirait, in Jakarta. Soon after, Indonesian Deputy Minister Fahri Hamzah confirmed Qatar’s pledge to expand its commitment to an additional five million housing units, making it the first foreign investor in President Prabowo Subianto’s program to construct three million homes annually. Sugiono’s visit can be seen as an effort to reaffirm this significant investment.
Defense and security cooperation also featured prominently in the discussions. While no new defense agreements were announced, the visit underscored the long-standing relationship between Qatar and Indonesia in this area. Over the years, military collaboration has expanded, with notable milestones such as the purchase of used Qatari Dassault Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets by the Indonesian Air Force (TNI-AU). This transaction marked the first of its kind, with Qatar choosing Indonesia over other buyers, signaling growing trust and interest in defense cooperation. Moreover, Indonesia has sought to increase its defense exports to Qatar, with both countries exploring opportunities for collaboration in areas such as defense production, technology transfer, and law enforcement cooperation, particularly between the Indonesian National Police and Qatar’s police force.
While Qatar is not a major global security actor, its growing defense needs have created an opportunity for Indonesia, which sees this as part of a broader effort to diversify its security partnerships, especially given the shifting dynamics of global power, with the United States’ waning influence in Southeast Asia and China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea.
One of the more interesting aspects of Sugiono’s visit was the discussion on Palestinian independence. Both Indonesia and Qatar have long been strong advocates for Palestinian sovereignty, and this shared commitment was reiterated in their conversations during the visit. Qatar has been a critical player in the Middle East peace process, particularly in mediating ceasefire efforts between Hamas and Israel, alongside Egypt and the U.S. This aligns closely with Indonesia’s longstanding position on the Palestinian issue, which has been a pillar of its foreign policy for decades.
This conversation is particularly noteworthy due to the longstanding history of cooperation between Indonesia and Qatar on international issues, including their joint efforts to address the Afghanistan crisis. Both nations have worked together to navigate the complex political landscape in Afghanistan, especially in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal. Their shared experience in managing such a high-stakes situation highlights the potential for further collaboration on global diplomacy and peacebuilding. The emphasis on Palestine during Sugiono’s visit should therefore be viewed as part of a broader effort by both countries to maintain a unified stance on global peace and security, particularly within the context of Middle Eastern conflicts. While the Palestinian cause remains a central issue for both nations, continued and more robust efforts will be needed from both sides to drive meaningful progress.
Another point of interest during Sugiono’s visit was the mention of President Prabowo Subianto’s planned state visit to Qatar later in 2025. While the visit has not yet taken place, and specifics remain unclear, its inclusion in the discussions raises some questions about the level of priority Indonesia is placing on its Middle Eastern relations. Prabowo, a former military leader with significant ties to the Middle East, was expected to play a central role in strengthening Indonesia’s relations with the region. However, his recent travels and engagements have been focused more on countries like China and India, with his Middle Eastern visits still only in the planning stages. The fact that Sugiono, rather than Prabowo, took the lead in Qatar speaks volumes about the current state of Indonesia’s foreign policy priorities. It appears that, while the Middle East is important, it is not receiving the same level of focus as other regions, particularly in terms of direct engagement by the president himself.
The absence of Prabowo from Sugiono’s visit also points to a broader trend in Indonesia’s approach to the Middle East. Although the region is undoubtedly significant, it does not seem to be the central focus of Indonesia’s diplomatic strategy under the current administration. Prabowo’s decision to prioritize engagements with powers like China and India rather than focusing on the Middle East may indicate that Indonesia is looking to expand its international influence through economic partnerships and strategic alliances in other regions. This is further reinforced by Sugiono’s participation in the Extraordinary Ministerial Conference of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in Saudi Arabia, which he attended shortly after his visit to Qatar. While the conference’s significance is not negligible, it was telling that Prabowo did not attend himself. This suggests that Indonesia while maintaining its relationships in the Middle East, is maintaining its foreign policy approach toward broader regional and global interests.
In this context, Sugiono’s visit to Qatar fits into Indonesia’s wider strategy of diversifying its foreign policy. It is part of the country’s ongoing efforts to strengthen ties with key players in the Gulf region, but it also highlights the broader balancing act Indonesia faces. On the one hand, Indonesia seeks to benefit from closer economic ties and regional stability by engaging with Qatar and other Gulf nations. On the other hand, it appears that Indonesia’s priority is to focus its attention on growing relationships with major global powers such as China and India, which offer more immediate and tangible diplomatic returns.
In conclusion, Sugiono’s visit to Qatar was an important but not particularly groundbreaking moment in Indonesia’s foreign policy. The housing MoU, defense discussions, and shared commitment to Palestinian sovereignty were positive outcomes, but they are part of a broader, ongoing effort to strengthen relations with the Gulf region. The visit does not suggest any major shift in Indonesia’s approach to the Middle East, nor does it indicate that the region is at the center of Indonesia’s diplomatic agenda. Rather, it reflects Indonesia’s desire to balance its regional engagements while also prioritizing relationships with other major global players. While the visit was certainly meaningful, it is unlikely to be seen as a major turning point in Indonesia’s foreign policy direction.
[Photo by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Qatar]
Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat is the Director of the Indonesia-MENA Desk at the Center of Economic and Law Studies in Jakarta. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.
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