The collapse of the Durrani dynasty paved the way for British expansion into the region. The British were deeply concerned that Russia would launch an attack on India, seeking to wrest control from them. This geopolitical rivalry became infamous as ‘The Great Game.’ Rudyard Kipling popularized the term in his writings, notably declaring, ‘Now I shall go far and far into the North, playing ‘the Great Game’. The fear of Russian expansion into Central Asia led Britain to design a buffer zone between Afghanistan and British India.
After suffering defeats in the First and Second Anglo-Afghan Wars, Britain shifted its strategy from conquest to containment, seeking to avoid direct control over Afghanistan. In 1880, the British backed Abdur Rahman Khan’s ascension to the throne, subjugating the influential Pashtun tribal networks. The completion of the Trans-Caspian railway in 1890 heightened concerns for the British Government of India, as it granted Russia the capability to rapidly deploy significant military forces to Afghanistan.
Drawing Borders, Dividing Nations
The original 1893 Durand Line Agreement was written in English, with translated copies in Dari. The Durand Line stretches 2,640 kilometers, forming the border between Afghanistan and British India, extending from the western border with Iran to the eastern border with China. Afghanistan ceded 40,000 square miles of territory in exchange for an increased annual British subsidy of 60,000 pounds and a guarantee of protection against external threats.
Afghanistan reaffirmed its recognition of the Indo-Afghan border through successive treaties signed in 1905, 1919, 1921 and 1930. The treaty fixed ‘the limit of their respective sphere of influence’. Because the Durand Line divides the Pashtun and Baloch people, it continues to be a source of tension between the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
No Afghan Ruler Has Legitimized the Durand Line
The Afghan Taliban is not alone in rejecting the Durand Line’s legitimacy. Since 1947, various Afghan governments have contested the border. On July 31, 1947, Afghan Prime Minister Shah Mahmood Khan made a significant declaration regarding the Indo-Afghan border. He stated that all existing agreements about the border had been made with British Indian authorities, implying that these agreements would no longer be valid once British India ceased to exist.
Sardar Mohammed Daoud Khan, Afghanistan’s former prime minister and president, also strongly opposed the Durand Line border and even launched a propaganda campaign against it. Former Afghan President Hamid Karzai made it clear in 2017 that Afghanistan would never recognize the Durand Line as the official border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, amid rising tensions between the two nations.
Taliban Adopts Historical Opposition to the Durand Line
The Taliban’s ideology is a complex blend of extremist Islam and Pashtun nationalism, leading to conflicting interests with Pakistan. Notably, the Taliban seeks to eliminate the Durand Line and reclaim Pashtun territories annexed by the British, which directly contradicts Pakistan’s territorial claims.
They argue that the border was imposed without the consent of the Afghan people and has led to the separation of Pashtun families and communities. Their argument further elaborates that the Durand line disrupts the Pashtun community’s trade and free movement, leaving them divided between countries.
Pakistan mistakenly believed the Taliban would legitimize the Durand Line and suppress Pashtun nationalist sentiments, but instead, the opposite occurred. According to Mullah Abdul Salam Zaif, Pakistan made three failed attempts to legitimize the Durand Line border during the Taliban’s reign, highlighting the Taliban’s steadfast refusal. Retired Pakistani General Naseerullah Babar’s suggestion to Mullah Omar that recognizing the Durand Line would “resolve all problems” was met with outrage, prompting Omar to expel Babar immediately.
The celebrations in Pakistan for the Taliban’s victory on Aug. 15, 2021, have been short-lived as cracks start to appear in the Taliban-Pakistan relationship around the legitimacy of the Durand line. Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai’s statement that “Afghanistan will never recognize the Durand Line as a border” echoes the long-standing position of Afghan governments since 1947. Maulvi Muhammad Yaqub Mujahid, the Taliban administration’s Defense Minister, downplayed the significance of the Durand Line, referring to it as simply a “line.” Zabiullah Mujahid, a Taliban spokesperson, has made it clear that Afghans strongly oppose the fence Pakistan has erected along the Durand Line.
The issues related to Durand Line were the first ones that created tensions between the two sides. As Pakistan increased its efforts to concretize the border fencing, the Afghan Taliban repeatedly contested Pakistani actions, which descended into dozens of violent acts along the border over the three years, often forcing Pakistan to close the border trading points for days together.
Analysts identify several reasons behind the Taliban’s defiant stance despite Pakistan’s efforts to appease them. The Taliban have good reason to unite Pashtuns and erase the Durand Line, as doing so would provide them immense domestic and regional legitimacy, potentially cementing their rule.
The Taliban leadership believes that embracing a strong nationalist agenda will yield political dividends, particularly given widespread Afghan concerns about their perceived close ties with Pakistan. This stance helps counter accusations that they act as Islamabad’s proxy.
The Taliban’s stance on the Durand Line is no surprise, given the historical context. What’s striking, however, is the Taliban’s bold move to openly challenge Pakistan’s fencing plan, despite relying heavily on Islamabad for political and diplomatic support. This assertive stance is a significant departure from previous Afghan governments’ approaches.
To sum up, the Taliban’s alignment with the historical perspective on the Durand Line exacerbates bilateral tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, with significant regional security implications.
[Header image: Weaveravel, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons]
Muhammad Nauman Akhter holds a PhD in International Politics from Shandong University, Qingdao Campus, China. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.
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