On March 5, 2025, Indonesia’s Deputy Minister of Defense, Lieutenant General (Ret.) Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, met with Jordan’s Ambassador to Indonesia, Sudqi Al Omoush, at the Ministry of Defense in Jakarta. The two discussed a draft memorandum aimed at expanding cooperation in military education, defense industries, and humanitarian coordination. For both nations, it was another step in a steadily growing relationship—one that reflects Jakarta’s broader push to build defense partnerships in the Middle East beyond its traditional allies.

Indonesia and Jordan have long shared a common diplomatic stance on the Palestinian cause. But recent developments point to something more structured and strategic. Over the past decade, defense diplomacy between the two has gradually taken shape. At the 2018 Special Operation Force Exhibition and Conference in Amman, then–Jordanian Prime Minister Hani Fawzi Al Mulki and former Indonesian Defense Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu explored cooperation in the defense field. Jordan also offered to share its counter-radicalization expertise and invited Indonesia to participate in programs at its Center for Counter-Extremism.

That same year, Indonesia’s ambassador, Andy Rachmianto, met with Jordanian Armed Forces Chief Lt. Gen. Mahmoud Freihat to promote Indonesian-made defense equipment—including PT Pindad’s Anoa armored vehicle—and to explore potential joint ventures with the King Abdullah II Design and Development Bureau (KADDB). Around the same time, Indonesia’s National Resilience Institute (LEMHANNAS) signed a memorandum with Jordan’s Royal National Defense College to expand officer exchanges and strategic education.

In 2020, ties advanced further when Jordan’s ambassador visited PT Pindad’s facilities in Bandung to discuss industrial collaboration. By 2023 and 2024, cooperation had expanded into humanitarian logistics, especially in response to the crisis in Gaza. In March 2024, the air forces of both nations coordinated an airdrop mission from King Abdullah II Air Base, using an Indonesian C-130J Super Hercules to deliver aid to southern Gaza. That September, 12 truckloads of Indonesian humanitarian supplies were delivered to Gaza via Jordanian logistical support. Indonesian NGOs, such as POROZ, have also collaborated with the Jordan Hashemite Charity Organization (JHCO) to deliver aid to Palestine.

Indonesia’s outreach in the Middle East goes beyond Jordan. Over the past decade, Jakarta has built defense and security ties with the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. A 2020 agreement with the UAE formalized cooperation in the defense industry, while Indonesia has also developed defense and military partnerships with Riyadh and Doha. Each relationship offers distinct strategic benefits—from joint exercises to technology transfers.

Yet Indonesia’s partnership with Jordan has developed a unique character. Unlike many defense relationships based largely on diplomatic declarations or training seminars, Jakarta and Amman have worked together in real-world operations—particularly in Gaza. These experiences have cultivated a level of trust that gives the relationship a tangible, operational depth.

That trust is reinforced by personal ties at the highest level. Indonesia’s newly elected president, Prabowo Subianto, and Jordan’s King Abdullah II share a connection rooted in their military backgrounds. The two first met in 1995, when Abdullah—then commander of Jordan’s special forces—visited Jakarta and attended Prabowo’s installation as commander of Kopassus, Indonesia’s special forces. In 1998, after Prabowo was discharged from the Indonesian military, he spent time in Jordan and was personally received by King Abdullah—who, according to family accounts, even offered him Jordanian citizenship.

Their bond has endured despite years of political upheaval. In 2014, the two reunited ahead of King Abdullah’s meeting with then-President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, reaffirming their longstanding rapport. Both men trained at the U.S. Army’s Fort Benning and share an affinity for military professionalism and pragmatic diplomacy. Following Prabowo’s presidential victory in 2024, King Abdullah was among the first foreign leaders to congratulate him. In that year, they also met at the Gaza humanitarian summit in Amman—underscoring their close relationship in a moment of shared purpose.

If sustained, the Indonesia–Jordan defense relationship is likely to deepen through practical collaboration in areas such as humanitarian assistance, military education, and defense-industrial cooperation. It reflects Jakarta’s growing interest in working with a broader array of Middle Eastern partners—particularly those where trust can be built gradually through shared experience.

The March 2025 meeting in Jakarta signaled a clear intent: both countries aim to institutionalize a long-term defense partnership. For Jordan, closer ties with Indonesia provide a strategic foothold in Southeast Asia—an increasingly critical region in global security dynamics. For Indonesia, Jordan represents not only an alternative security partner in the Middle East but also a reliable ally for practical, on-the-ground cooperation in crisis settings like Gaza.

As Jakarta expands its security footprint across the region, its partnership with Amman stands out—not for its fanfare, but for its quiet, cumulative progress. In an era of transactional alliances, Indonesia and Jordan are building something more enduring: a defense relationship rooted in shared values, operational trust, and decades of mutual respect.

[Photo by Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia]

Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat is the Director of the Indonesia-MENA Desk at the Center of Economic and Law Studies in Jakarta. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.

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