Changing Face of Insurgency in Balochistan

The fifth wave of the Baloch insurgency was sparked by the assassination of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti in 2006. Initially, the movement was led by tribal groups, but it eventually evolved to encompass the middle-class and educated segments of society. The aftermath of Bugti’s assassination saw a large-scale civil disobedience movement in the province. It has contributed to the emergence and proliferation of several insurgent groups in the province. The ongoing fifth wave of insurgency has been marked by increasing violence, with attacks on military forces, law enforcement agencies, government installations, gas pipelines, and targeted killing of people from other provinces in Balochistan. Over time, the movement has transformed, with the middle-class and educated segments of society becoming increasingly involved, driven by economic grievances, political marginalization, and human rights abuses.

Recently, multiple militant groups have been involved in insurgency in Balochistan. Key players include the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), the Baloch Nationalist Army (BNA), the United Baloch Army (UBA), the Balochistan Liberation United Front (BLUF), Lashkar-e-Balochistan (LeB), the Baloch Republican Army (BRA), the Balochistan Liberation Tigers (BeLT), and the Baloch Raji Ajoi Sangar (BRAS), which is an umbrella organization seeking to unite insurgent groups under a single command.

However, in 2017, the BLA experienced a significant split, when two of its members — Ustad Aslam Achu and Bashir Zeb — were expelled due to violating group command rules. It led to the formation of a splinter group, also using the name BLA, which has since become one of the deadliest groups carrying out numerous militant activities in Balochistan and Karachi. The splinter group is led by Bashir Zeb, who took over after Ustad Aslam’s killing in Afghanistan, which has evolved into a sophisticated militant outfit with various wings, including the Fateh Squad, responsible for clearing the way for suicide bombers; the Majeed Brigade, which carries out suicide attacks; ZIRAB (Zephyr Intelligence Research & Analysis Bureau), functioning as the intelligence wing for data collection and analysis; and Hakkal, serving as the information wing.

This structural transformation has enabled the group to shift its tactics from traditional guerrilla warfare to more sophisticated urban warfare, posing a significant threat to provincial security. The group has expanded its operations, targeting not only security forces but also civilians and infrastructure. Insurgent groups are also targeting Chinese nationals with the deliberate intention of damaging the country’s critical relations with China and sabotaging the CPEC. It appears to be a strategic move that aims to undermine Pakistan’s economic interests, create tensions between Islamabad and Beijing, disrupt law and order, and discourage Chinese nationals from visiting Pakistan.

The two major insurgent groups in Balochistan — the BLA and the BLF — have been responsible for numerous attacks in the province. The BLA is evolving from guerrilla warfare to sophisticated urban warfare, while the BLF, led by Dr. Allah Nazar Baloch since 2004, remains focused on guerrilla warfare, ambushes, and attacks on development projects, primarily in Awaran, Panjgur, and Turbat. Notably, the BLA has a presence in both rural and urban centers, with a strong concentration in Baloch ethnic areas such as Makran, Kalat, Quetta, Sibi, and Nasirabad divisions of Balochistan province.

With expanding information technology, the insurgent groups continue to leverage social media to disseminate propaganda, foster anti-state sentiments, and recruit new members. Insurgent groups now carry out coordinated attacks, exert control over highways, and target ethnic groups from other provinces, particularly Punjab. By employing tactics such as simultaneous multiple-target attacks, they want to divert the focus of security forces. Insurgent groups have developed a diversionary strategy, where they block highways to divert the attention of law enforcement agencies and paramilitary forces, while simultaneously carrying out attacks on other targets. A notable example of this tactic is the incident where they blocked multiple highways across the province, while targeting a Frontier Corps (FC) camp in Lasbela district of Balochistan with a suicide bombing carried out by a female combatant through a “Fedayeen” operation dubbed “Herof” on Aug. 26, 2024, marking the 18^th death anniversary of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti.

Moreover, insurgent groups have also expanded their recruitment tactics to include women in combative roles, thereby exploiting their perceived vulnerability and psychological docility to utilize them as shields for suicide bombing missions. This tactic not only inflicts damage on the target but also creates a psychological impact on the security forces. Women are often lured into the insurgency through social media, which has increased their exposure to propaganda warfare, allowing insurgents to disseminate tailored messages that resonate with their emotions and concerns.

Furthermore, the educated class in Balochistan is also increasingly joining the insurgency, driven by feelings of marginalization and frustration stemming from the perceived disparity in development and basic rights between their province and other parts of the country. This sense of deprivation, coupled with a lack of employment opportunities after getting education, is fostering anti-state sentiments. It has “compelled” them to take up arms against the state. The insurgents effectively tap into these grievances, using them as a “rallying cry” to mobilize support and justify their actions. The BLA’s strategy is designed to exploit the state’s security policy in order to drive a wedge between the state and society.

In a dramatic strategic shift, insurgent groups — particularly the BLA — are seeking to obtain belligerent status by temporarily occupying certain areas of the province to demonstrate their capabilities, with the ultimate goal of gaining international recognition. As the security forces focus on combating the insurgency, the BLA seizes opportunities to occupy areas, showcasing its strength and control. This temporary occupation allows the BLA to claim belligerent status, seeking recognition as a legitimate entity in Balochistan. International law grants certain rights and duties to belligerents, which the BLA hopes to leverage to its advantage. By securing belligerent status, the BLA aims to gain legitimacy, both domestically and internationally.

The group’s social media campaigns and public outreach efforts are designed to build support and create a narrative of resistance against the state. As the BLA continues to challenge the state’s authority, it is likely to further erode trust between the state and society. The BLA seeks to garner public support, capitalizing on the collateral damage and anti-state sentiments created by state security operations. This tactic has led to a deterioration in state-society relations, with the public increasingly turning towards the BLA and developing favorable sentiments towards the group. Moreover, the insurgent group appears to be seeking a political face in the province, which may enable it to acquire political legitimacy in the long run.

The state’s response to the insurgency will be crucial in determining the outcome of this conflict. A heavy-handed approach may only serve to fuel further resentment and support for the BLA. In contrast, a pragmatic approach like addressing the grievances of the Baloch people and providing economic opportunities may help to undermine the BLA’s appeal. Indeed, the quest of BLA for belligerent status is a calculated move to gain legitimacy and challenge the state’s authority. The outcome of this conflict will depend on the state’s ability to respond effectively to the strategy of insurgents and address the underlying grievances driving the insurgency.

The current military-centric approach to the insurgency in Balochistan has proven ineffective and counterproductive. The US intelligence estimates that around 25000 army and paramilitary forces are involved in counter-insurgency operation in Balochistan. It has only amplified grievances and deteriorated state-society relations. So, the state ought to rethink its security policy. The military option has solely focused on militant groups, but the government has neglected the civil population as military operations have contributed to collateral damage and human rights abuses that has affected civil society badly. As a result, it has led to poor public perception of the government and widened the chasm of trust between the state and society, which can only indeed be bridged through political reconciliation.

To achieve lasting peace in Balochistan, it is imperative to move beyond a solely military-centric approach. The state must prioritize political engagement and reconciliation over military action. Establishing a truth and reconciliation commission to resolve the “missing persons” issue and constituting a powerful parliamentary committee to initiate a multilayered dialogue with various stakeholders are crucial steps in this process. In dealing with hardcore militant groups, targeted operations should be carried out in parallel with non-kinetic policies aimed at earning public support and restoring state-society relations. Empowering local government and focusing on socioeconomic development can also help alleviate the governance deficit that has contributed to the insurgency. In fact, addressing the underlying issues of economic deprivation, political disenfranchisement, and social marginalization is essential to finding a lasting solution to the conflict.

[Image by TUBS, CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons]

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.